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Abstract
We consider the comparative statics of consumer demand when there
are consumption externalities in one commodity between two individu-
als.We show that the externaliy can switch goods which would naturally
be normal into inferior goods and as a result the externality can also lead
to Giﬀen goods. In addition the externality can transform complementar-
ity relations between goods. Thus substitutes can become complements
or vice versa once the feedback eﬀects of the externality are taken into
account. Next we consider the eﬀect of externalities on Slutsky symme-
try and negativity restrictions With consumption externalities there are
generalised forms of such restrictions. We derive these both for the two
individual case and for cases in which either there are two individuals
but all goods may cause externalities or there is a single externality good
but H individuals. We relate the generalised symmetry restrictions to
the rank conditions of Browning and Chiappori. Finally we consider the
eﬀects of consumption externalities on consumer surplus analysis.
JEL Nos: D1,D 6 ,R 2
Externalities in consumption have often been stressed in the conspicuous
consumption literature where the motivation is primarily one of envy. There
are also commodities where there are technological reasons for consumption ex-
ternalities. Two obvious examples are consumption activities that are subject
to congestion e.g. many recreational activities ranging from cycling, through
beach holidays to watching a football match, and consumption activities that
have a network dimension like telephone calls or ownership of mobile phones.
Of course there are also explicit group activities like card games or chess. There
is not really a well developed theory of consumer behaviour or of testable re-
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1strictions arising in this context to match the theory of consumption without
externalities.
In this paper we want to address three questions:
• What are the eﬀects on the comparative statics of consumer demand of
having consumption externalities between consumers?
• In an environment where there are consumption externalities can we ﬁnd
conditions we can test empirically for the existence of individual consumer
preferences with consumption externalities?
• Can we see how welfare analysis e.g. consumer surplus analysis is aﬀected
by consumption externalities?
The answer that we ﬁnd to the ﬁrst point is that particular types of consump-
tion externality patterns can reverse the usual comparative static predictions of
price or income changes so that for example even if in private terms no good
is inferior for any individual, once the external eﬀects are taken into account,
goods can appear empirically inferior or even Giﬀen. In a variety of contexts of
diﬀerent generality (in terms of the number of consumers, the number of goods
and the ways that externality eﬀects arise) we answer the second question by
ﬁnding testable restrictions on individual and market demand that will allow
us to distinguish situations where externalities are important. Finally we show
that the presence of external eﬀects may actually make consumers welcome price
increases rather than reductions so that the usual predictions of consumer sur-
plus analysis can be reversed in the presence of consumption externalities. More
precisely our results are that:
• The externality can reverse the sign of the comparative static eﬀects of
2income or price changes;
• In general for any given individual budget constraints there may be multi-
ple preference maximising individual demands once the externalities have
been taken into account;
• There is a form of the Slutsky symmetry restriction as a necessary condi-
tion for preference maximisation which is related to the Browning-Chiappori
(B-C) idea of adding rank one matrices to the usual Slutsky matrix but
that these rank one matrices represent the eﬀect of externalities on a
given individuals preferences not the eﬀect of price-income dependence in
a group preference function. In B-C the rank one matrices are ”arbitrary”
in as much as their form depends both on the way in which the function
of prices and/or income enters preferences and on the form of the function
of prices and income. The eﬀects have the interpretation of representing
the way in which the distributional power between a group of individu-
als varies with prices and income. In our case the matrices are arbitrary
because they depend on the way in which externalities enter individual
utilities in general. We also have more of these matrices since each ex-
ternality between a pair of individuals or goods gives a distinct channel
through which there are additional price/income eﬀects on demand. How-
ever the functional form for each externality eﬀect has some restriction
in principle since this must represent the Nash equilibrium demand of
another individual for some good;
• When there are only two individuals and a single good that has external
eﬀects between the two then the form of the rank one matrix that should be
added is fully determined and there is a simple empirical test for both the
3presence of externalities and the existence of individual preferences which
generalises the usual Slutsky symmetry condition. With H individuals
and a single good through which there are general externalities for all
individuals, H −1 rank one matrices must be added to the pseudoSlutsky
matrix to give a form that is symmetric. The nature of these rank one
matrices is derived and is observable so in principle testing is possible.
• A special case of some interest is what we term common popular exter-
nalities: with H individuals, each individual utility depends on the total
consumption by all other individuals of one externality-inducing good.
This is like a pure congestion case. Here we show that although there
are H individuals, only a single rank one matrix must be added to the
pseudoSlutsky matrix to result in a symmetric matrix;
• Similarly we have a generalised form of the negative semideﬁniteness con-
dition for these cases;
• The externality may be of a form which makes the consumer beneﬁtf r o m
price increases rather than price decreases and the usual consumer surplus
will reveal this.
The general framework we use has H individuals with the hth having prefer-
ences deﬁned by uh(xh;x−h) where the notation x−h indicates the consumption
of each good by each individual other than h. Since this is very general often
we specialise it to two individuals and/or cases in which only some goods have
externalities. We envisage an environment in which each individual has a pri-
vate budget mh and all individuals face the same market prices. Each individual
takes decisions privately to maximise their own utility conditional on the choices
4of other individuals i.e. given their budget constraint each individual makes a
best response to the consumption activities of others. We then analyse what we
call a Nash equilibrium in which these best responses are mutually consistent1.
Our analysis is all static so we do not address questions of how external eﬀects
evolve, nor questions of dynamic adjustment (with a given set of interdependent
preferences) of one individuals consumption to that of others.
There are links between some of our results and those of models with price
dependent preferences or which are concerned with particular aspects of in-
trahousehold decision-making-the literature dealing with the collective model.
So the plan of the paper is to start by recalling three main results from this
literature and then move on to consider the two individual case with a single
externality inducing good in Section 2 where we analyse both the comparative
statics and the generalised Slutsky symmetry restrictions. In Section 3 we allow
all goods to have externality eﬀects and look at the form of the Slutsky sym-
metry restrictions, in Section 4 we take H individuals and a single externality
good also specialising this to the case in which the externality works through
the total consumption of other individuals of that good and in Section 5 we
analyse the eﬀects of the externality on consumer surplus.
1 Some Prior Literature
There is a prior literature focusing more on the related topics of price dependent
preferences and the collective model of group e.g. household decisionmaking.
The earlier literature on externalities e.g. McKenzie (1955) looks more at nor-
mative properties showing that with general consumption externalities, person-
1In terms of formal game theory, each individual has a strategy space consisting of choice
of an n vector xh which satisﬁes his budget constraint and a continuous payoﬀ function
depending on the actions of all. The game is played simultaneously by all individuals.
5alised pricing is necessary to decentralise a Pareto optimum-this is equivalent
to a system of Pigovian taxes. As we will see the price dependent literature is
close to the questions we wish to analyse. Pollak(1977) shows that in a world
in which individual preferences have the form u(x,p)w h e r ex and p are respec-
tively vectors of quantities consumed and prices paid per unit in competitive
markets, preferences are not uniquely deﬁned by demand behaviour. For ex-
ample two sets of preferences of the form F(v(x),p)a n dG(v(x),p)w h e r eF()
and G() are increasing in v() will generate exactly the same demand behaviour
since both sets of demands solve the problem max{v(x)|p0x ≤ m} where m is
the consumers income. On the other hand he also shows that any system of
demand equations xi = fi(p,m) which are homogeneous of degree zero and sat-
isfy the budget constraint can be used to construct a ﬁxed coeﬃcients utility
function that will then have generated those demands. More precisely any de-
mand system xi = fi(p,m), homogeneous of degree zero in p,m which satisﬁes
the budget constraint and which has no inferior goods can be rationalised by
the utility
V (x,p)=m i n {x1,h 2(x2,p),...hn(xn,p)}
where hi(xi,p)i sd e ﬁned by xi = gi(p,hi(xi,p)) for i>1, and gi(p,x1)=
fi(p,g1(x1,p)) for i>1a n dg1(x1,p)i sd e ﬁned by x1 = f1(p,g1(x1,p)). His
idea is that we compute the income g1() that would make the individual buy
the ﬁxed quantity x1 at any prices p. Then calculate the quantity of each other
good(gi() for i>1) that the individual would buy at any prices with this income
g1(x1,p), and ﬁnally compute the quantity of good 1 that the individual will
buy if they buy xi of good i at prices p, when income is set at a level such that
they buy x1 = hi(xi,p) units of good 1.Having ﬁxed coeﬃcients guarantees that
6the individual will choose x1 = hi(xi,p)f o ri>1 and so replicates the actual
demand behaviour. The implication here is that if we allow utility to depend on
prices and income in an arbitrary way except for homogeneity then there are no
restrictions on demand behaviour beyond adding up and homogeneity of degree
zero.
On the other hand broadly in the collective scenario, Browning and Chi-
appori (1998) show that if the group acts so as to spend its household budget
so as to achieve a particular Pareto optimum, the choice of which itself de-
pends on prices and income, then it is as if the household has a utility function
which depends on prices and income. For example take 2 individuals each
with preferences given by uh(xh),h = A,B. In general these individuals con-
sume the same goods2. If goods are purchased in competitive markets and
the group has a total budget m to allocate then any Pareto optimal alloca-
tion between the individuals will lead to a form of group preferences given by
v(x,λ)=m a x {λu1(x1)+( 1− λ)u2(x2)|x1 + x2 ≤ x}. The solution to this
problem deﬁnes the allocation of each commodity between the two individuals
xi = Xi(x,λ). As 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 varies over the unit interval diﬀerent Pareto op-
tima are deﬁned. If the group always selects a Pareto optimal outcome then
group decisions solve max{v(x,λ)|p0x ≤ m} giving a two stage representation
of the demands: optimal aggregate quantities are given by x = X(p,m,λ)a n d
these are then allocated between the individuals. If we add to this speciﬁcation
the assumption that λ = Λ(p,m,..) then the group decisions are taken to max-
imise a price dependent preference function. Browning and Chiappori go on
2In fact they allow for intrahousehold externalities and also a particular type of intra-
household public good since they take uh(xA,x B,X) with total household purchases of good
i being xi = xAi + xBi + Xi. We abstract from this since our interest is in interhousehold
externalities ie in the function v(.)b e l o w .
7to show that if group decisions are taken in this way then the usual individual
Slutsky symmetry condition which is a necessary condition for individual utility
maximisation (and with the addition of negative semideﬁniteness of the Slutsky
matrix and some regularity conditions also a suﬃcient condition for utility max-
imisation) is generalised. The observable analogue to the usual Slutsky matrix
(they call this the pseudo-Slutsky matrix) is replaced by the pure Slutsky ma-
trix which abstracts from the eﬀect of prices on preferences (and is symmetric)
plus a rank one matrix. With a number of individuals greater than two but
less than the number of goods the pseudo-Slutsky matrix is equal to the sum
of a symmetric matrix and a number of rank one matrices. In general with H
individuals H − 1 rank one matrices are required. Finally they show that with
two individuals restrictions of this type on the pseudo-Slutsky matrix only have
bite if there are at least ﬁve goods or if the number of individuals is no greater
than one less than the number of goods.
Lechene and Preston (2000) take a two individual model where each indi-
vidual’s utility depends on consumption of m goods private to them and on
consumption of n public goods. The public goods are purchased on markets in
varying quantities by each individual. Each spends his exogenous private income
on his private goods and quantities of the public goods so as to maximise his
utility taking the purchase of public goods by the other individual as ﬁxed. They
then look for a Nash equilibrium in which each individuals choices in public and
private goods are a best response to the choices of the other individual within
the budget constraint. They go on to consider the case in which each individual
has preferences that are separable between the private and public goods and the
subutility preferences for the public goods are identical everywhere for the two
8individuals. Within this framework they derive comparative static restrictions
on the demands for each individual and show, in particular, that there is a form
of B-C restriction on cross price and income responses. This paper is closest to
the approach that we take but we consider more general forms of preferences
than they do and more than two individuals. The reason that they restrict
individual preferences in this way is that they argue that a Nash equilibrium
in which both individuals have positive spending on each public good is only
possible if individual preferences over public goods are at least locally identical
since they argue that each individual in Nash equilibrium must want the same
aggregate purchase by both of them of each public good. However whilst suf-
ﬁcient this is not necessary- take a simple example with a single public good
which satisﬁes separability but which does not have identical preferences. For
example let
uA(qA,Q A + QB)=
X
i
βAi ln(qAi − αAi)+γA ln(QA + QB − δA)
uB(qB,Q A + QB)=
X
i





βBi+γB = 1 for individuals A and B and for well deﬁned
preferences quantities are restricted so that (qAi − αAi) > 0;( qBi − αBi) > 0;
(QA+QB−δA) > 0a n dQA+QB−δB > 0. Each individual has n private goods
and one good Q subject to externalities where it is the total consumption that
matters. Each individual maximises their utility within their budget constraint
X
piqhi + πQh ≤ mh
and so has reaction curves given by
qhi = αhi + βhi[mh −
X
αhipi − π(δh − Qk)]/pi
Qh = δh − Qk + γh[mh −
X
αhipi − π(δh − Qk)]/π
9The Nash equilibrium is determined just from the last equation for each indi-
vidual. Rewriting these
Qh = δh +( γh − 1)Qk + γh[mh −
X
αhipi − πδh]/π
and solving these for Qh
Qh =
δh + γh[mh −
P
αhipi − πδh]/π +( γh − 1){δk + γk[mk −
P
αkipi − πδk]/π}
1 − (γA − 1)(γB − 1)
Then the Nash equilibrium total purchase of the public good is
Q =
δAγB(1 − γA)+δBγA(1 − γB)+γAγB
P
mh/π








which, as Lechene and Preston say, depends only on total income of the two. The
quantity Q in (1) is also identical to that which each individual would choose if
they selected their private consumptions and the total public good consumption
Q using the combined income of the two individuals net of the cost of buying
the other individuals private goods. The point is that there so many arbitrary
functions involved (each individuals demand for each private and public good)
that requiring them to want the same aggregate of public good spending in Nash
equilibrium or that (1) be an interior solution for each individuals public good
purchase does not require that they have identical preferences.
2 Two Individuals; One Externality Inducing Good
To clarify the notation in this case let the two individuals be A,B and let good 1
cause the externality so that preferences for the two are given by uA(x1A,..xnA,x 1B),
uB(x1B,..xnB,x 1A) where for example xiA denotes the quantity of good i con-
sumed by individual A. The individual best responses or reaction curves are
10deﬁned by
{X1A(p,mA,x 1B)...XnA(p,mA,x 1B)} =a r gm a x {uA(x1A,..xnA,x 1B)|p0xA ≤ mA,x iA ≥ 0}
{X1B(p,mA,x 1A)...XnB(p,mA,x 1A)} =a r gm a x {uB(x1B,..xnB,x 1A)|p0xB ≤ mB,x iB ≥ 0}
and a consistent or Nash equilibrium requiring mutual best responses is de-
ﬁned by the system FiA(p,mA,m B),F iB(p,mA,m B) i =1 ..n which solves the
equations
FiA(p,mA,m B)=XiA(p,mA,F 1B(p,mA,m B)) (2)
FiB(p,mA,m B)=XiB(p,mB,F 1A(p,mA,m B)) (3)
This system of equations can be solved in two steps: ﬁrst solve the two equations
F1A(p,mA,m B)=X1A(p,mA,F 1B(p,mA,m B)) (4)
F1B(p,mA,m B)=X1B(p,mB,F 1A(p,mA,m B)) (5)
for the Nash equilibrium demands for the ﬁrstgood: F1A(p,mA,m B), F1B(p,mA,m B)
and then substitute these demands into the remaining equations of (2),(3) for
i =2 ...n to deﬁne the Nash equilibrium demands for the remaining goods. It
follows that much of the analysis can be undertaken just by looking at the ﬁrst
good.
We assume that individual preferences are such that each wishes to purchase
a positive quantity of every good and that the reaction curves are continuously
diﬀerentiable. Nash equilibria involving corners (where there is zero consump-
tion by some individuals of a good with external eﬀects) are of interest but not
11central to our concern of comparative statics3.
In terms of the reaction functions we deﬁne
Deﬁnition 1 Strong externalities for any good i to be the case in which
∂XiA/∂x1B∂XiB/∂x1A > 1
Deﬁnition 2 Symmetric externalities for any good i where
sign(∂XiA/∂x1B)=sign(∂XiB/∂x1A)
Deﬁnition 3 Positive externalities for any good i to be the case in which
sign(∂XiA/∂x1B) > 0;sign(∂XiB/∂x1A) > 0
negative externalities externalities where
sign(∂XiA/∂x1B) < 0;sign(∂XiB/∂x1A) < 0
and mixed externalities where sign(∂XiA/∂x1B)=−sign(∂XiB/∂x1A)
3To sketch out how to extend our analysis, let





pixih ≤ mh − p1x1h}
and let e x1k solve
∂Uh(0,e x1k)
∂x1h =0a n dx∗
1h solve
∂Uh(x1h,0)
∂x1h =0 . Here e x1k is the level of k0s
consumption of good 1 which makes h wish to consume 0 of good 1. And x∗
1h is the optimal
level of consumption of good 1 for h if k0s consumption of good 1 is zero.
The complete analysis is tedious as there are many cases but to illustrate take the case
where the reaction curves in good 1 for each individual have negative slope and Uh is concave
in x1h. The best response for say individual A,x1A, is then x1A =0f o rx1B ≥ e x1B
x∗
1A ≥ x1A > 0f o r0≤ x1B ≤ e x1B.
We then have four cases:
(1) x∗
1A > e x1A,x ∗
1B > e x1B
Here there is an interior Nash equilibrium with both individuals consuming positive quan-
tities of good 1
(2) x∗
1A > e x1A,x ∗
1B < e x1B
Here there is a unique Nash equilibrium with x1A =0 ,x 1B > 0
(3) x∗
1A < e x1A,x ∗
1B > e x1B
Here the unique Nash equilibrium has x1A > 0,x 1B =0
(4) x∗
1A < e x1A,x ∗
1B < e x1B
Here there are three Nash equilibria: one at (0, e x1B), one at (e x1A,0) and one with both
individuals consuming positive quantities of good 1.
12Strong externalities restrict the relative slopes of the reaction curves; Figs 1,
2 show cases of strong and weak externalities where they are positive and Figs
3, 4 show strong and weak externalities where they are negative. If preferences
exhibit mixed externalities at any prices and incomes then there is at most one
Nash equilibrium, we could ensure there is exactly one by imposing boundary
conditions on the reaction curves. When there are symmetric either positive or





















Fig 4. Strong symmetric positive externalities
132.1 Comparative Static Eﬀects of Price and Income Changes
The ﬁrst point we wish to make is that the interdependence of preferences can
reverse the signs of comparative static eﬀects. In general many Nash equilibria
may exist and there are many possible conﬁgurations. In the present framework
if both reaction curves in good 1 have the same slope always or if at least one of
the reaction curves for good 1 changes slope, there may be any number (ﬁnite or
iniﬁnite) of Nash equilibria although generically there is always an odd number
of equilibria. But we can make our point in contexts in which there is a single
Nash equilibrium. So we assume4:
• There is a unique interior Nash Equilibrium for any (p,mh).
Suppose that there no inferior goods in the system of individual reaction
curves so that ∂Xih/∂mh > 0f o rh = A,B. Then if the externality is suﬃciently
strong it can reverse the comparative static eﬀects of price or income changes





















































4With several Nash equilibria the idea of comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium
becomes quite ambiguous-which equilibrium do we compare with which before and after a




















































so long as the denominator is non-zero. If we take j =1w ek n o wt h a ts i n c e
thereare no inferior goods, ∂X1h/∂p1 < 0. The sign of ∂F1h/∂p1 is then dictated
by the strength and the sign of the marginal externality eﬀects: let D =1−
∂X1A/∂x1B ·∂X1B/∂x1A. If D>0 so that external eﬀects are weak then when
external eﬀects are positive the sign of ∂F1h/∂p1 < 0 and the comparative
static eﬀects are preserved despite the externality. But if external eﬀects are
strong (D<0) and positive then the ﬁrst good appears as a Giﬀen good (
∂F1h/∂p1 > 0). The intuition is that with strong positive external eﬀects if
the price of good 1 rises there is a gain from increasing the purchase of good
1 because this leads the other individual to increase their purchase of good 1
which more than compensates for the reduction on spending on other goods.
This gives us
Proposition 1 (i) if D>0,∂X1h/∂x1k > 0 then ∂F1h/∂p1 < 0
(ii) if D<0,∂X1h/∂x1k > 0 then ∂F1h/∂p1 > 0
(iii) if ∂X1h/∂x1k < 0 then ∂F1h/∂p1 is of ambiguous sign with either strong
or weak externalities.
The sign of D is given by the asymmetry/symmetry and strength of the
external eﬀects between the two individuals. If the externality is one-way so
15that either ∂X1A/∂x1B =0o r∂X1B/∂x1A =0t h e nD = 1 and unless there is
a strong symmetric externality, D>0. If D>0 then the signs of comparative
statics are preserved if the externality is positive. If the externality is asym-
metric so that ∂X1A/∂x1B · ∂X1B/∂x1A < 0t h e nD>0. Thus to reverse the
comparative statics of price changes for good 1 requires either a strong positive























Fig. 8. Strong Positive externalities: a fall in p1
We can see this geometrically. Since the price change aﬀects both individuals,
both reaction curves shift. When both reaction curves have positive slope but
externalities are weak, a fall in p1 by itself raises consumption of good 1 by each
individual; this consumption increase further raises the consumption of each
16individual through the external eﬀect and so that result is unambiguous: for
each individual ∂Fih/∂p1 < 0 when the reaction curves both have positive slope.
But if externalities are positive and strong then the fall in p1 raises individual
B’s consumption of good 1 by so much that in Nash equilibrium individual A
reduces his consumption of good 1. On the other hand if either the reaction
curves both have negative slope, or have diﬀering slopes then the price fall in
good 1 serves to raise the consumption for each individual of that good but for at
least one individual the externality eﬀect is then working in a negative direction
so that the overall eﬀect for the individual of the price fall is ambiguous: for at
least one h in these cases ∂Fih/∂p1 is of ambiguous sign.
For j>1 similar forces are at work. The sign of ∂F1h/∂pj may be opposite
to that of ∂X1h/∂pj. For example suppose that for both individuals goods 1
and j are either complements or substitutes. Then if D<0a n dm a r g i n a l
external eﬀects are positive in the Nash equilibrium, goods 1 and j appear with
the opposite relationship - substitutes become complements and complements
become substitutes.
Proposition 2 For j>1 in Nash equilibrium goods 1 and j are complements if
externalities are strong and positive and goods j and 1 are naturally substitutes.



























so that for example if i and j are substitutes in the reaction curve of A, goods
1a n dj are complements for both A and B, external eﬀects are strong and
positive, then i and j are substitutes for A in the Nash equilibrium. On the
o t h e rh a n di fa l lt h e s eg o o d si,j,1 are complements for both A and B and there
17are strong positive externalities, then it is possible that in the Nash equilibrium
goods i and j are substitutes for A.













So for good 1 we see that it will appear inferior if external eﬀects are strong.
From (8), and (11) we also get the sign of the eﬀect of the other individuals
income on the demand for good 1. It is given by the sign of the marginal external
eﬀect.
Proposition 3 Good 1 is inferior in the Nash equilibrium if external eﬀects are
strong





















so that if external eﬀects are positive but weak then good i is normal despite
the externality. But if either external eﬀects are strong and positive or are weak
but negative and the marginal propensity to consume good 1 is high then good
i>1 may appear as inferior in the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Good i>1 c a nb ei n f e r i o ri nt h eN a s he q u i l i b r i u mi f
(i) external eﬀects are strong and positive
or if
(ii) external eﬀects are weak but negative and the marginal propensity to
consume good 1 is high
18(i) is especially interesting: the externality itself is positive in the sense that
taken on its own in the reaction curves an increase in B’s consumption of a good
leads A to increase his consumption of the good. So although each individual
beneﬁts from the consumption of the other, the fact that in equilibrium indi-
viduals must be making mutual best responses means that we may observe an




















F i g1 2a ni n c r e a s ei nmA
As always fundamental properties stemming from the individual budget con-
straints are preserved in the Nash equilibrium. Thus
Proposition 5 (a) Xih(.) and Fih(.) are each homogeneous of degree zero in p
and the relevant incomes
19(b)
P
piFih ≡ mh ≡
P
piXih
from which Engel aggregation properties such as
X
pi∂Fih/∂mh ≡ 1 ≡
X
pi∂Xih/∂mh
follow as do conditions like
X












forms a symmetric and negative semideﬁnite matrix. But if decisions are taken
as we hypothesise and the market is always in Nash equilibrium then econo-
metrically all we can estimate are the functions Fih(p,mA,m B) and so we wish



































































































































are symmetric in i and j
and each of these forms a negative semideﬁnite matrix.
Note that if there is no externality eﬀect so that ∂FiA
∂mB = ∂FiB
∂mA =0this reduces
to symmetry of the regular Slutsky matrix.
We can relate this condition to the Browning-Chiappori rank result. For























=[ Sij]+[ Ai][Bj]( 2 4 )
21where Sij = Sji. and the product [Ai][Bj] forms a rank one matrix. Taking the
















= AiBj − AjBi (25)
Since the terms in this equation are observable in principle then the restric-
tion is testable in the same way as in Browning-Chiappori. The sign restric-
tion on the matrix in Proposition 6 tells us that externality corrected ”pseudo-
compensated” demands slope downwards.
3 Two Individuals and General Externalities
In this section we generalise the preceding results to the case in which all goods
may have an externality inducing eﬀect. Here A and B have preferences given
by uh(xA,x B),h= A,B where xh is an n vector. The links between the reaction
curves and the equilibrium demands become
FiA(p,mA,m B)=XiA(p,mA,F 1B(p,mA,m B),..FnB(p,mA,m B)) (26)
FiB(p,mA,m B)=XiB(p,mB,F 1A(p,mA,m B),..FnA(p,mA,m B)) (27)
3.1 Comparative Statics of Price and Income Changes
The logic of calculating the slopes of Nash equilibrium demands or Engel curves









































































































































































































































































































































As in the case with a single good causing the externality, the Nash equi-
librium comparative static eﬀects of price changes are combinations of changes
coming from every reaction curve and the externality eﬀects. It is then pos-
sible for signs of changes to be reversed between the reaction curve and the
Nash equilibrium demand. In (30) there are two sorts of feedback eﬀects of
a price change working through the externalities. Firstly the price change
causes A to change consumption of all goods which in itself shifts A0s reac-
tion curve. Secondly the price change leads B to change consumption of all
goods which then leads to a further change by A. Either of these eﬀects can
result in a sign reversal eg we may have ∂FiA/∂pj > 0 but ∂XiA/∂pj < 0i f
























tend to be of opposite sign to those
in ∂XiB/∂pj. It is perhaps easier to see this in the marginal propensities to
consume in (31).
3.2 Symmetry Conditions With Two Individuals and Gen-
eral Externalities
One approach to exploring symmetry restrictions would be to use (28),(29)



















































































































which make the LHS observable matrix a combination of two symmetric ma-
trices. However for empirical application this is cumbersome, although theo-
retically it is attractive because it stresses the importance of both individual’s
incomes in ”compensating” one individual.



































































We can use (34),(35) to solve for one of the marginal externality eﬀects in terms
of the other and hence derive a symmetry result.
Proposition 9 Consumer demands are consistent with general externalities in












































each be symmetric and negative semideﬁnite matrices.
This proposition bears a family resemblance to the Browning-Chiappori re-
sult but there are two major diﬀerences. Here the factors refer to marginal
externality eﬀects across goods and individuals whereas in Browning-Chiappori
the arbitrary factors refer to eﬀects of prices on preferences. However we have
2(n − 1) rank one matrices instead of just two since each pair of goods are
connected by an externality which generates one channel by which there are
additional price-income eﬀects on demand. Secondly we have diﬀerences be-
tween the Slutsky term for goods i and j and the Slutsky term for goods i and
1a p p e a r i n g .
263.3 An Externality Aggregate
A special case of general externalities in the two individual world is that in
which each individuals utility depends on their own consumption and on some
aggregate function of the consumption of the other individual. Thus Uh =
uh(xh,V(xk)) for h = A,B,k 6= h. An even more special case of this would be
one-way externalities where say only individual A has an externality and he is
aﬀected by the level of utility of individual B either through a caring relation or
through envy. In this case the externality function for individual A is just the
level of utility of individual B and B has no externality function. In the case
of general one way externalities so that only A has externality eﬀects in their























































a n di ft h ee x t e r n a l i t yi nA’s utility comes through a single aggregate function













With just a one way externality from B to A the symmetry condition of

























must be a symmetric and negative semideﬁnite matrix, while for individual B









27must be a symmetric and negative semideﬁnite matrix. When B has no external
eﬀects in his utility, his Slutsky and pseudoSlutsky matrices coincide and so the
symmetry condition for B is just that of the regular theory. It is obvious but
still interesting that with one way externalities, those individuals without exter-
nalities will obey traditional theory-their best response is unique whatever the
action of others. It is as if their reaction curve is vertical. But those individuals
aﬀected by externalities will capture all of the eﬀects of the externalities.
4 H individuals and a single externality good
Here the situation is analogous to that with two individuals. In Nash equilibrium
we have nH equations:
Fih(p,mA,...mH)=XiA(p,mh,F 1−h(p,mA,...mH)) (38)
where F1−h(p,mA,...mH)r e p r e s e n t st h eH − 1 list of equilibrium demands for
good 1 of all individuals other than h.
This system of equations can be solved in two steps: ﬁrst solve the H equa-
tions involving good 1
F1h(p,mA,...mH)=X1A(p,mh,F 1−h(p,mA,...mH)) (39)






































284.1 Comparative Static Eﬀects of Income and Price Changes

































































































    

















































∂m1 0 . 0
...
.. .





Using the equations for the ﬁrst commodity (i = 1) and solving for the eﬀects
of price and income changes gives


































































Proposition 10 represents a matrix generalisation of (12),(13),(15) and (16)
and has the same interpretation as those equations. In Nash equilibrium the
marginal eﬀect of one individuals income on the quantity demanded of good i by
another individual depends on the feedback eﬀects of that individual’s income
via changes in the demand for good 1 by all other individuals and similarly
for prices. Hence again strong externalities can reverse the sign of comparative
static eﬀects.
4.2 Symmetry Conditions for H Individuals and a Single
Externality Good
















. We can use this to expess




























w h i c hi st h es u mo fas y m m e t r i cm a t r i xa n dH − 1 terms each of which is of










However to derive testable restrictions it is more useful to express the Slutsky
matrix in terms of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix. We want to use (42) to solve
30for the marginal externality eﬀects: the unknowns are the n(H − 1)2 terms
∂Xiη/∂x1h. In fact the equations can be solved in blocks of H − 1 equations
that involve the H − 1t e r m s∂X1η/∂x1h for ﬁxed values of η and i as k varies
through its possible H − 1v a l u e s .


















∂FiA/∂mB · ∂F1C/∂mC − ∂F1C/∂mB · ∂FiA/∂mC
∂F1B/∂mC · ∂FiA/∂mC − ∂FiA/∂mB · ∂F1B/∂mC
¸
/
/(∂FiB/∂mB · ∂FiC/∂mC − ∂FiC/∂mB · ∂FiB/∂mC)
and similar systems for individuals B and C. We can use the solution for the
externality eﬀects to deduce a symmetry restriction.


































 is a function of ob-
servable partial derivatives of the F() functions so long as
























      

is nonsingular for each h,i.
4.3 Common Popular Single Channel Eﬀects
The formulation in (38) is quite general in that the externality depends both
on the aggregate consumption of the ﬁr s tg o o da n do nt h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fi t s
31consumption. A special case of this with some appeal is that in which only the
total consumption of good 1 by all other individuals aﬀects the preferences of
any one individual. This is similar to the model that Lechene-Preston study







Again we ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium by ﬁrst solving the H equations for the
Nash equilibrium functions for good 1, then substituting these back for the other
goods.



































































which must form a symmetric and negative semideﬁnite matrix.
(48) itself imposes some restriction on the form of the Nash equilibrium
demands since the RHS must be independent of k.
325W e l f a r e E ﬀects of Price Changes
A traditional approach to welfare analysis of price changes uses either the com-
pensating or equivalent variation measured as the change in the consumers ex-
penditure function due to the price change. In the two individual case with only
good 1 having an externality eﬀect, the consumer surplus measure of the cost
of price change from p to p0 is
CSA(p,p0,x 1B,u A)=gA(p0,x 1B,u A) − gA(p,x1B,u A)( 5 0 )
where gA(p0,x 1B,u A) measures the minimum cost at p0,x 1B to the consumer of
attaining a utility level of uA. For uA either the original or new utility level can
be taken. This is often approximated by





j − pj)( 5 1 )
if only the jth price changes, which we can interpret as the area beneath the
compensated demand curve for good j. If a price rises then, if B0s consumption
of good 1 is ﬁxed, A is unambiguously worse oﬀ.I f A,B are always in Nash
equilibrium instead we have
CSA(p,p0,m A,m B,u A)=gA(p0,F 1B(p0,m A,m B),u A) − gA(p,F1B(p,mA,m B),u A)
(52)
a n dw h e no n l yt h ejth price changes the approximation would become












j − pj)( 5 3 )
We know that ∂gA(p,x1B,u A)/∂pj > 0 but we can have the result that A
is actually better oﬀ from a price rise if the term ∂gA/∂F1B · ∂F1B/∂pj is
suﬃciently negative. Thus either if there are strong positive externalities so that
∂gA/∂F1B < 0 and goods 1 and j are substitutes for B in the Nash equilibrium,
33or if there are negative externalities so that ∂gA/∂F1B > 0 and goods 1 and
j are complements for B in the Nash equilibrium, then A may be better oﬀ
from a rise in p1. The intuition is that the price rise induces B to change his
consumption of good 1 to raise A0s welfare by more than cost increasing eﬀect
of the price rise reduces A0s welfare.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed the eﬀects of consumption externalities on the
comparative static properties of consumer demands. Two particular properties
are important in determining these- the strength of the externality and its sign.
If externalities are strong they can overturn the usual comparative static eﬀects
and in directions that are sometimes surprising. Thus with strong positive
externalities between two individuals, goods which are basically normal can
become inferior under the presence of the externality. We have also found that
there are generalised forms of Slutsky symmetry restrictions so that in contrast
with the general price dependent literature (Pollak) there are some restrictions
on demand when we know something about the source of the price dependence
of utility. The externalities can also reverse the usual welfare implications of
price changes so that for example it is possible that consumers will prefer price
increases to price falls.
AA p p e n d i x












































































































































































































































































































































































where SB is also symmetric.








































































































































































36Here the right hand sides of each equation must be symmetric and negative
semideﬁnite matrices. On the RHS’s there are n − 1 arbitrary factors in each
equation given by the marginal externality terms ∂XiA/∂xkB,∂XiB/∂xkA.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0 . Using the equations for the ﬁrst commodity

















































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2 . We want to use (42) to solve for the marginal
externality eﬀects: the unknowns are the n(H − 1)2 terms ∂Xiη/∂x1h. In fact
t h ee q u a t i o n sc a nb es o l v e di nb l o c k so fH −1 equations that involve the H −1
terms ∂X1η/∂x1h for ﬁxed values of η and i as k varies through its possible
H − 1v a l u e s .
We have
Fih(p,mA,...mH)=Xih(p,mh,F 1−h(p,mA,...mH)) (56)
37All H incomes enter Fih but only H −1 functions F1η enter the RHS. Diﬀeren-
tiate this equation wrt each mk,k6= h and write the result in matrix notation
as a system of H − 1 equations in H − 1v a r i a b l e s∂Xih/∂F1k for k 6= h :
fh = zh


























































      

So long as zih is nonsingular for each h,i we can solve to get


















ih fih = Aihfih for each h and i.








































































































must be symmetric and negative semideﬁnite. This relates to the rank one
restriction idea except now that for each good and each individual h, H − 1
rank one symmetric matrices have to be added to
Phh to ensure its symmetry.
Of course these additional rank one matrices are deﬁn e di nt e r m so fo b s e r v a b l e
derivatives of the Nash equilibrium demands.
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